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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
Case No. 930513-CA

V.

:

DONALD EUGENE LEWIS,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for two counts of
unlawful taking of protected wildlife, class A misdemeanors, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-4 (1991), two counts of waste
of protected wildlife, class B misdemeanors, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § -23-20-8 (1991), two counts of aiding or assisting
another in the unlawful possession of protected wildlife, class A
misdemeanors, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-23 (1991),
and two counts of aiding or assisting another in the waste of
protected wildlife, class B misdemeanors, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 23-20-23 (1991), in the Sixth Judicial District Court
in and for Kane County, State of Utah, the Honorable David L.
Mower, presiding.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1994),

generally, provides for this Court's jurisdiction in a case of
this type; however, the circumstances of the case indicate that
the Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The issues presented in this appeal are:
1.
appeal?

Does this Court have jurisdiction to hear this

The trial court had no occasion to address this

question, which must therefore be addressed in the first instance
by this Court.
2.

Did defendant waive his right to appeal by

deliberately refusing to appear for trial and sentencing?

The

trial court had no occasion to address this question, which must
therefore be addressed in the first instance by this Court.
3.

Did defendant invite error by knowingly choosing

not to appear for trial following notice and then claiming on
appeal that he did not waive his right to assistance of counsel
at trial?

Whether defendant has invited error is, by its nature,

a question which must be addressed in the first instance on
appeal.

Also, because defendant was not present at trial and the

issue of waiver of right of counsel was not brought to the trial
court's attention, the issue is one which must be addressed in
the first instance by this Court.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and
rules are set out in Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was first charged by information, in case no.
91-CR-0071, with two counts of unlawful taking of protected
2

wildlife, class A misdemeanors, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 23-20-4 (1991), and two counts of waste of protected wildlife,
class B misdemeanors, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-8
(1991) (R. 170-72) . To defend against those charges, defendant
retained R. Clayton Huntsman on November 26, 1991 (R. 168-69) .
The same day defendant was released on $5,000 bail (R. 173-74).
Defendant was then charged by amended information with
additional offenses, i.e. two counts of aiding and assisting in
the taking of protected wildlife, class A misdemeanors, and two
counts of aiding and assisting in the waste of protected
wildlife, class B misdemeanors, all in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 23-20-23 (1991) (R. 153-56).
Defendant moved to sever the newly charged offenses
from those first charged (R. 151-52), and the trial court granted
the motion (R. 149-50).

A new case number was assigned (see

minute entry of January 17, 1992, R. 148), and defendant retained
Brian R. Florence in case no. 9216000031 and as lead counsel in
both cases (R. 69, 76). 2
On September 2, 1992, the prosecution moved to
consolidate the two cases (R. 56-57).
On October 19, 1992, Florence moved to withdraw as
1

The order of severance clearly suggests that case no.
921600003 came to embrace the four counts of aiding and assisting
(R. 149-50) .
2

Although the trial court's minute entry indicates that
Florence represented that he was acting as lead counsel in both
cases, Florence did not formally enter his appearance in case no.
9-CR-0071 until six months later (R. 146-47).
3

defense counsel from both cases because defendant was unwilling
to pay him sufficiently to try the matters (Motion to Withdraw as
Counsel, R. 50-52, attached at Addendum B).

The motion also

stated that "defendant is aware that [Florence] intends to make
this request and that [defendant] would be responsible for
appearing with counsel or by himself at any future trial setting"
(R. 51). A copy of the motion was sent to defendant on October
21. (R. 52).
On October 21, Huntsman also filed a motion to withdraw
from case no. 91-CR-0071, not only because defendant was
"unwilling to pay the necessary attorney fee to try this case and
its potentially joined case, No. 921600003," but also because
"[d]efendant has otherwise not cooperated with counsel, making
counsel's attempt to adequately defend much more difficult and
essentially impractical" (Motion for Order Authorizing Withdrawal
of Counsel, R. 86-87, attached at Addendum B).

Huntsman sent a

copy of the request only to Florence and to the state's attorney
(R. 88). However, the motion also stated that "[d]efendant has
been advised often over the past year of this request and
understands that he is responsible for appearing at any future
trial, with or without counsel" (R. 87).
Each of defendant's counsel's motion to withdraw stated
that trial in case no. 91-CR-0071 was set for December 21 through
December 23.

Eight days later, on October 29, the prosecutor

sent defendant a notice to substitute counsel, referencing both
cases by number, advising defendant that both his attorneys had
4

withdrawn and that he must substitute counsel within twenty days
(Notice to Substitute Counsel, R. 4 8-49, attached at Addendum C).
At this time, the State's motion to consolidate the two cases for
trial was pending (R. 50, 56-57).
On November 20, 1992, the trial court consolidated the
two cases under case number 91-CR-0071 (see Order, R. 32-34; 47).
Defendant was not present at the proceeding, but was represented
by Huntsman (R. 32, 47). The Court also granted Florence's and
Huntsman's requests to withdraw as counsel (R. 33, 47).
On December 17, the court mailed a copy of the order to
defendant (R. 34). In addition to alerting defendant to the fact
that both his attorneys were no longer representing him, the
order notified defendant that a non-jury trial would be set for
December 21 ,{R. 32-33) . The trial court had previously sent
defendant a notice, on or about November 23, referring to both
cases, that he or his counsel must appear at a December 4
scheduling conference to consider his jury demand (R. 46). The
prosecutor also sent a similar notice to defendant on November 25
(Notice of Scheduling Conference, R. 44-45, attached at Addendum
E), but defendant did not appear (R. 43). On December 8, the
prosecutor sent defendant a notice of non-jury trial, informing
defendant of the time and place of trial and that his appearance
was required (Notice of Non-Jury Trial, R. 41-42, attached at
Addendum F ) .
Defendant failed to appear at trial on December 21,
1992, and defense counsel was also not present.
5

The following

colloquy took place between the trial court and the prosecutor:
THE COURT: When we look at the file, I
think there have been notices sent to him and
his lawyers and I think you've sent most of
those, haven't you?
MR. SCARTH [Prosecutor]: Yeah. I don't
mean to be facetious, but for months we've
been sending notices of the trial on this
day, originally that it would be a jury trial
on this date at the "a.m." and then, more
recently, that it would be--[inaudible].
THE COURT: None of those ever came back
from the Post Office?
MR. SCARTH:
returned.

None have ever been

THE COURT: But you've never had any
affirmative reaction from Mr. Lewis that he
ever got anything from you.
MR. SCARTH: That's right. I've sent
him not only notices of the trial, but notice
of the substitute counsel, various orders
prior to being signed, for his review, after
being signed by the Court. We've sent him
copies. We've received no reaction from him
since--well, I've never heard from Mr. Lewis,
ever. Neither has anyone on my staff.
THE COURT: He had two lawyers at one
time and they both sent him a notice to
appoint counsel.
MR. SCARTH: Correct. Through his
attorneys, of course, I've heard from him.
But only through his former attorneys.
They've now both withdrawn.

THE COURT: . . . Well, I'm satisfied
that Mr. Lewis knows about these proceedings
today and has voluntarily chosen not to
appear and the motion, by the State, to
proceed in the absence of Mr. Lewis is
granted . . . .
(Trial Transcript, "TT." 4-6, attached "at Addendum G ) .
6

The trial proceeded and the court found defendant
guilty on all counts (Judgment, R. 18-19, attached at Addendum
H).

The court sent a copy of the judgment to defendant on

January 19, 1993, informing him of his conviction and requiring
him to appear for a sentencing hearing on January 22 (R. 19).
Previously, on January 6, the prosecutor had sent defendant a
notice informing defendant of the time and place of sentencing
and that his presence was required (R. 23-24). The prosecutor had
also sent defendant a notice of forfeiture on January 11 advising
him that his presence was required for the January 22nd
forfeiture hearing (R. 20-22).
Defendant failed to appear for his sentencing hearing on
January 22 (R. 17). Again, the trial court and prosecutor
discussed defendant's non-appearance:
THE COURT: . . . Today's the day for
sentencing.

Donald E. Lewis, with you [sic] are you
here?
[NO RESPONSE]
. . . Any reason not to have the
sentencing hearing now, Mr. Scarth?
MR. SCARTH: None, Your Honor. I
believe the defendant has received adequate
notice. My office mailed him notice some
time back.
The judgment itself, which was dated by
this Court on the 14th of January, 1993, the
last sentence says "Sentencing in this matter
will commence on January 22nd, 1993, at 9:00
a.m. in Kanab, Utah. The defendant's
presence at sentencing is required."
7

Now that wasn't mailed to Mr. Lewis
until the 19th day of January, 1993; however,
prior to mailing it to the court, some four
or five days prior to the 19th--what I'm
saying is five days prior to that, we mailed
Mr. Lewis a letter with a proposed order,
telling him if he had any objection, let me
know in five days. I never heard from him.
It was also about that same time frame
that we sent him a notice to appear here-specifically to appear for sentencing at this
time, place, and date.
THE COURT: It's the same address that
you've sent other papers to.
MR. SCARTH: That's correct. And
nothing's come back undelivered.
THE COURT: Today's the day for the
sentencing. I don't see a reason not to hold
a sentencing today.
(Sentencing Transcript, "ST." 3-4, attached at Addendum J ) .
The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of four
years in the"Kane County Jail on all of the four class A
misdemeanor convictions, and to a term of two years on all of the
four class B misdemeanor convictions, suspending all except for
two years. Another judgment was signed on February 19 and
entered and mailed to defendant on February 22 (Judgment,
Sentence and Order of Forfeiture, R. 6-9, attached at Addendum
K).

Also on February 19, 1993, the trial court issued a warrant

for defendant's arrest, setting bail at $20,000.00 (R. 10).
Subsequently defendant was arrested in Alabama.
On July 15, 1993, the trial court modified defendant's
sentence, suspending execution of all but 60 days of jail time
and placing defendant on probation (R. 182-83).

8

Defendant was

present with counsel, Gary Pendleton and David Belser (R. 2, 18283).

Defendant filed a notice of appeal on August 13, 1993

(R. 1) .
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A statement of the facts relating to the offenses for
which defendant was convicted is unnecessary to resolve the
issues on appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
Because defendant's notice of appeal was filed more
than seven months after the entry of the judgment, defendant's
appeal is out-of-time.

This Court does not have jurisdiction

over an out-of-time appeal.
dismissed.

Therefore, the appeal should be

Defendant's remedy, if any, is to file a petition for

post-conviction relief under rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, in the sentencing court, seeking to be resentenced
nunc pro tunc, and to then file a timely notice of appeal.
POINT II
Although rule 22(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
states that the trial court shall inform a defendant of his right
of appeal and the time period in which the right must be
exercised, defendant prevented the trial court from fulfilling
that duty by his disregard of, and absence from, the trial and
sentencing proceedings, following notice.

Defendant knew that

his presence was required at these proceedings.

By flouting the

authority of the trial court, defendant demonstrated his lack of
9

intention to affect the outcome of the proceedings and thereby
effectively waived his right of appeal.

To consider defendant's

claim that the trial court erred in failing to inform him of his
right of appeal would be to sanction a procedure that invites
error.
All authority cited by defendant is irrelevant because
the appellants in those cases appeared before the trial court,
which failed to inform them of their appeal rights, a
circumstance radically different from that in this case. Also,
that authority uses a stricter standard for trial court
compliance than Utah does.
Contrary to foreign authority cited by defendant, the
time for filing the notice of appeal in Utah begins with the
entry of the judgment, not with the point at which the trial
court informs the defendant of his right of appeal.
POINT III
Defendant invited error by deliberately absenting
himself from the proceedings, knowing that he was expected to
appear, and then raising a claim that he was denied assistance of
counsel at trial.

Therefore, this Court should decline to

consider defendant's claim on the merits.

In any event,

defendant did waive his right to assistance of counsel by
deliberately absenting himself from the proceedings because he
knew his counsel had withdrawn and was aware that he was thereby
expected to appear.

10

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO HEAR
AN OUT-OF-TIME APPEAL
Defendant filed his notice of appeal on August 13, 1993
(R. 1) , almost six months after the entry of the judgment (R. 1).
Recognizing that the notice of appeal had been untimely filed,
this Court requested that both defendant and the State submit
memoranda explaining why the appeal should or should not be
summarily dismissed.

After the memoranda had been submitted,

this Court ruled that because defendant had not filed any postconviction motions, which might have effectively extended the
period for filing the notice of appeal, the notice of appeal was
not timely filed from the February 22, 1993 order.

However, the

Court also ruled that the notice of appeal was timely filed from
the modified sentencing order and limited the appeal to issues
arising out of that modification (see Order of October 27, 1993).
Defendant took issue with the Court's apparent failure
to even acknowledge the substance of his argument or to recognize
that the issues raised on appeal had nothing to do with the
modified sentencing order (see defendant's letter of November 4,
1993) . In apparent response, this Court issued an order vacating
its October 27th order and deferred consideration of the issues
raised pending plenary presentation of the case on appeal (see
Order of November 15, 1993).
Rule 4(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides
that "the notice of appeal . . . shall be filed with the clerk of
11

the trial court within 3 0 days after the date of entry of
judgment . . . ."

Utah R. App. P. 4(a). This Court's rules

preclude it from extending the time for filing the notice of
appeal required by rule 4(a). See Utah R. App. P. 2 and
22(b)(2).

Therefore, if a defendant files an untimely notice of

appeal, the appellate court does not have jurisdiction over the
appeal.

See State v. Palmer, 777 P.2d 521, 522-23 (Utah App.

1989) (per curiam) (appellate court lacks jurisdiction to hear
appeal as of right when the defendant's notice of appeal is
untimely and the defendant failed to file a Rule 4(e) motion to
extend).
Defendant apparently argues that because the trial
court did not inform him of his right to appeal and the thirtyday time period within which his appeal must be filed, his notice
of appeal was timely filed.

Appellant's Br. at Point I.

While

defendant's argument as to the trial court's duty may deserve
consideration, he misapprehends the jurisdictional impediment
posed by the appellate rules and caselaw in bringing his claims
before this Court.
In State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36 (Utah 1981), the
defendant also failed to timely file a notice of appeal.

The

court noted that the 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal
in a criminal case is jurisdictional and cannot be enlarged by an
appellate court.

Id. at 37.

Therefore, this Court held:

of-time appeals must be dismissed."

Id.

"Out-

Recognizing, however, a

criminal defendant's constitutional right to a timely appeal, the
12

Court noted that a defendant could establish the denial of the
right by moving for relief under rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, in the sentencing court.

The sentencing court could

take evidence and sentence the defendant nunc pro tunc, from
which sentence the defendant could take a timely appeal.

Id.

Accord State v. Hallett, 856 P.2d 1060, 1062 n.2 (Utah 1993).
In this case also, defendant's remedy, if any, lies in
filing a petition for post-conviction relief under rule 65B.
However, because defendant failed to both file in the trial court
a timely notice of appeal or a post-conviction motion which might
have extended the time for filing a notice of appeal, defendant's
appeal is out-of-time and cannot be considered by this Court.
Therefore, defendant's appeal must be dismissed.
Even though defendant also effectively acknowledges
that his remedy is through a rule 65B petition for postconviction relief, see Appellant's Br. at 8 n.2., the State
addresses the merits of defendant's claim that the trial court
erred in failing to inform him of his right to appeal.
POINT II
DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL BY
DISREGARDING THE TRIAL AND SENTENCING
PROCEEDINGS AFTER REPEATED NOTICE
Rule 22(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides
that "[f]ollowing imposition of sentence, the court shall advise
the defendant of his right to appeal and the time within which
any appeal shall be filed."

Utah R. Crim. P. 22(c).

However,

the rule does not contemplate the circumstance in which a
13

defendant deliberately refuses to attend the proceedings or
submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
1.

Defendant's
Voluntary
Absence
from the Proceedings
Prevented
the Court from Informing
Him
of his Appeal
Rights.
In State v. Mvers, 29 Utah 2d 301, 508 P.2d 1178 (Utah

1973), the defendant's appointed counsel appeared on the first
day of trial, but not on the second.

The defendant, out on bail,

did not appear at all and was convicted.

On appeal the defendant

argued that he had been deprived of his constitutional right of
counsel.

The Utah Supreme Court held that the defendant could

hardly assert the right "when he . . . flouted the authority of
the court by his absence . . . ."
P.2d at 1179.

Id. 29 Utah 2d at 303, 508

The court also noted that Myers, counsel in his

own right, could not realistically argue prejudice "without
succumbing to a charge of unassertable invited error."

Id.

Similarly, in State v. Ross, 655 P.2d 641 (Utah 1982)
(per curiam), the defendant absconded from the state while on
bail before his second trial and resisted extradition.

The

defendant was convicted on all counts following a trial in
absentia.

On appeal Ross argued that the State had failed to

prove that his absence was voluntary and that in being tried in
absentia he had been deprived of his constitutional right of due
process.

The supreme court affirmed the convictions, holding

that any failure of the State to establish voluntariness or
waiver of consent was obviated by defendant's own actions which
prevented his attendance at trial.
14

Id. at 642.

"In such cases,"

the court stated, "it is generally held that the defendant cannot
bv his voluntary act invalidate the proceedings."
added).

The court further stated:

Id. (emphasis

"It may be fairly said that

defendant has invited error by indulging in a conscious,
deliberate act of absconding, which cannot be a basis for a
reversal."

Id.
In Cleff v. State, 565 N.E.2d 1089 (Ind. Ct. App.

1991), the defendant absconded from the jurisdiction following
conviction on a ten-count charge after learning from his counsel
that the jail term was likely to be thirty-five years. The
defendant failed to appear for the sentencing.

Later he

petitioned to file a belated praecipe, a procedural requirement
for filing an appeal.

The trial court denied the petition.

The

defendant appealed claiming the trial court erred in holding that
he had waived his right to appeal by remaining absent from the
sentencing hearing where his appeal rights would have been
provided.
In rejecting Cleff's claim, the Indiana Court of
Appeals held that even though the Indiana Constitution gave a
criminal defendant an absolute right to appeal, Cleffs escape
was a voluntary act which resulted in his failure to file a
motion to correct errors or a praecipe within the statutorily
required period and that he had thereby voluntarily and knowingly
waived his absolute right to appeal.
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Cleff, 565 N.E.2d at

1092.3 Compare State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703, 704-05 (Utah 1985)
(allowing reinstatement of an existing appeal, dismissed after
defendant escaped the jurisdiction, on the grounds that the
escape did not establish an intent to abandon the appeal and that
failure to reinstate the appeal would constitute punishment
irrelevant to the offense of escape).
In this case defendant clearly refused to cooperate
with counsel from the outset, resulting in counsel's withdrawal.
The withdrawal requests of both defendant's attorneys, filed in
late October, 1992, attest to defendant's being informed that he
was responsible for appearing personally or through counsel at
trial beginning December 21 (R. 51, 87). At least one of these
notices was mailed to defendant (R. 52). Defendant failed to
appear at the December 4th scheduling conference after being
twice noticed at least one week prior to the conference.

Both

3

At first blush State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703 (Utah 1985),
might appear contrary to Cleff, and relevant to this case. In
Tuttle, the defendant was convicted, sentenced and committed. He
then filed an appeal and later escaped. When he was returned to
custody, his appeal was dismissed. The supreme court reinstated
the appeal, rejecting the questionable assumption made in State
v. Brady, 655 P.2d 1132 (1982), that one who escapes has actually
made a decision to abandon his appeal, and noting that "[a] far
more reasonable assumption is that the escapee has not even
considered how his escape will affect his appeal rights."
Tuttle, 713 P.2d at 704. In support of its holding, the court
noted that dismissing the defendant's appeal would be double
punishment for the separate offense of escape. Id. at 704-05.
Tuttle is distinguishable from this case. Defendant's
total disregard of the proceedings, especially given his
awareness that he would have to personally appear since he was no
longer represented by counsel, evidence a complete disinterest in
the outcome of the trial and sentencing. Further, dismissing
this appeal would be precisely the appropriate action in response
to defendant's total disregaird of his interests.
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notices specifically required defendant's appearance (R. 44-45,
46).

Defendant was sent one notice of the December 21st trial on

December 8.

That notice informed defendant that his presence at

trial was required (R. 41-42).

Two more notices of trial, one of

which ordered his presence, were sent on December 17 (R. 3 0-31,
32-34) . Defendant failed to appear at trial (R. 27).
Defendant was also informed of the January 22, 1993
sentencing hearing through notices, requiring his presence, sent
on January 6 and January 11 (the latter noticing forfeiture
proceeding on January 22) and through mailing of the judgment on
January 19, also requiring defendant's presence (R. 18-19).
Defendant failed to appear at the sentencing (R. 17).
A notice of a February 19, 1994 bail hearing, requiring
defendant's presence, was sent to defendant on February 11 (R.
13-14).

Defendant did not appear at the hearing, and the trial

court issued a bench warrant, notice of which was also mailed to
defendant (R. 10-11, 12, 181).
Every notice sent to defendant was mailed to the same
address.

At both the trial and the sentencing, the prosecutor

stated that none of the notices had been returned (TT. 4-5; ST.
3).

The record does not indicate that any notices sent to

defendant were returned.
Defendant only made his first appearance in court at
the sentence modification hearing on July 15, 1993, more than
seven months after his counsel had withdrawn and his first
appearance at a scheduling conference was required.
17

The facts

demonstrate that defendant flouted the authority of the court by
absenting himself from the proceedings in the face of repeated
notice requiring his presence in court.

Such conduct, in

refusing to make any appearance in the proceedings, either
personally or through counsel, also shows that defendant
voluntarily abandoned any interest in their outcome.
Rule 22(c) contemplates that the trial court will
inform a defendant of his appeal rights at the time of
sentencing.

As in Cleff, the rule does not contemplate that in

order to provide a defendant his rights, a trial court is
required to chase a defendant who has voluntarily and generally
disregarded the court's authority and specifically absented
himself from the very proceeding in which he would have received
notice of his appeal rights.

This conclusion is supported by

rule 22(b), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that
a defendant may be sentenced in his absence and that "[i]f a
defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for his arrest
may be issued by the court."

Utah R. Crim. P. 11(b).

The rule

does not assign to the trial court the further duty of locating
an absent defendant to inform him of his appeal rights.
By analogy, Ross and Mvers also support this
conclusion.

Both Ross and Mvers argue that such conduct amounts

to invited error, which render a defendant's claims unassertable.
See also State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1205-06 (Utah App. 1991)
(noting that the invited error doctrine prohibits a party from
setting up an error at trial and then complaining of it on appeal
18

and, therefore, refusing to even consider the correctness of a
jury instruction submitted by defendant as manifestly unjust
because defendant had invited the error); State v. Bullock, 791
P.2d 155, 158-59 (Utah 1989) (refusing to consider the
defendant's conscious choice not to object to expert testimony
under the plain error doctrine because, if the challenged
evidence were then admitted, the supreme court "would be
sanctioning a procedure that fosters invited error").

Similarly,

this Court should refuse to consider the merits of defendant's
claim because defendant's voluntary conduct prevented the court
from fulfilling its obligations under the rules of court.

2.

In All Cases Cited by Defendant
The Appellants
Were Present at
Sentencing.
Defendant cites a number of cases in which the

appellants' appeals, generally dismissed for untimeliness, were
effectively reinstated or remanded to the lower courts with
directions to resentence.

Appellant's Br. at 5-7.

Not one of

these cases involves an appellant who intentionally absented
himself from the sentencing hearing in defiance of notices and
orders that he appear.

Rather, in each case, it is evident that

the appellant appeared at the sentencing hearing, generally with
counsel, and the trial court failed to inform the appellant of
his right to appeal.

See Kirk v. United States, 447 F.2d 749,

750 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Benthien, 434 F.2d 1031,
1032 (1st Cir. 1970); Nance v. United States, 422 F.2d 590, 592
(7th Cir. 1970); Paige v. United States, 443 F.2d 781, 781 (4th
19

Cir. 1971); United States v. Butler, 938 F.2d 702, 703 (6th Cir.
1991); Hannigan v. United States, 341 F.2d 587, 588 (10th Cir.
1965); State v. Mitchell, 642 P.2d 981, 983 (Kan. 1982); Bovd v.
State, 282 A.2d 169, 170 (Me. 1971); State v. Fletcher, 417 A.2d
106, 108 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980); and State v. Carmodv,
243 N.W.2d 348, 349 (N.D. 1976).
Because authority cited by defendant discusses the
trial court's duty to inform a defendant of his right to appeal
in circumstances radically different from those in this case, it
is not helpful to the resolution of the issue on appeal.

3.

Federal Authority,
Cited byDefendant, Applies a
Different
Standard Than That Used in Utah.
Defendant's authority also applies a far more demanding

standard to the trial court's duty to inform defendant of his
right to appeal than Utah requires.
Rule 32(a) (2), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
provides that after the trial court imposes sentence it "shall"
advise the defendant of his appeal rights, including the right to
appeal in forma pauperis.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(a)(2).

The

language of the federal rule has been generally strictly
interpreted by federal circuit courts of appeal. Applying the
rule, the court in Kirk presumed that the defendant had not
voluntarily abandoned his appeal when he did nothing further
after first filing it, and reversed the denial of the defendant's
petition for post-conviction relief.

Kirk, 447 F.2d at 751.

Similarly, in Benthien, the court held that, even though the
20

petitioner's counsel informed the petitioner that he could
appeal, the order dismissing the petition must be vacated because
the trial court had not strictly complied with the rule requiring
the trial court to inform the defendant of his right to appeal.
Benthien, 434 F.2d at 1032. See also Nance, 422 F.2d at 591-92
(the defendant may have been deprived of right of appeal because
unsure whether he had rights in forma pauperis, even though he
knew he could appeal).

Effectively, defendant's cited authority

requires per se reversal for failure to strictly comply with the
governing rule.
The standard is not so high in Utah.

In State v.

Crowe, 649 P.2d 2 (Utah 1982) (per curiam), the trial court
advised the defendant of his right to appeal after the jury
returned its verdict, but did not do so at the time of
sentencing.

Noting that defendant had a constitutional right of

appeal, the supreme court held that the rule violation was
harmless.

Id. at 2.

See also United States v. Drummond, 903

F.2d 1171, 1174-75 (8th Cir. 1990) (rejecting approach of per se
reversal for technical violation of rule 32(a)(2) and finding
harmless the trial court's failure to inform the defendant of his
right of appeal where counsel had done so).
The State asserts that there is no trial court error
because defendant never gave the court the opportunity to inform
him of his right of appeal and thereby waived the right.
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However, even if there were error it would be harmless.4

The

only substantive claim of error on appeal is that defendant was
denied his right to assistance of counsel, a right which he did
not waive.

Appellant's Br. at Point II. However, as argued

below, that claim is totally without merit because the record
amply shows that, through notice, defendant was aware that
counsel would not be representing him at trial and that in the
absence of counsel he knew he would be responsible for appearing
himself.

Appellee's Br. at Point III. Thus, even if defendant

has preserved his right of appeal, he is not entitled to a
reversal of his conviction.
4.

A Trial Court's
Failure
to
Inform A Defendant of His Right of
Appeal Does Not Extend the Time
For Filing
the Notice of
Appeal.
Defendant cites Boyd and Fletcher for the proposition

that the time for taking an appeal does not begin to run until
the defendant has been advised of his right of appeal.
Appellant's Br. at 6-7.

In each case, where the lower court had

failed to inform the defendant of his right of appeal, the
defendant's out-of-time appeal was reinstated.
170-73; Fletcher, 417 A.2d at 109.
4

Boyd, 282 A.2d at

In so ruling, Boyd and

In all criminal prosecutions a defendant has a
constitutional right to appeal. Utah Const, art I, § 12; Boggess
v. Morris, 635 P.2d 39, 41 (Utah 1981). The standard applied to
evaluating a state constitutional error is uncertain. See State
v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100, 106 n.12 (Utah 1988) ("And this Court has
never squarely decided whether violations of the Utah
Constitution must be addressed under the federal constitutional
standard of "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" or the lesser
"erosion of confidence" standard of rule 3 0 we employ in
analyzing state law issues of nonconstitutional dimensions.")
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Fletcher effect ively held that the jurisdictional period for
filing an appeal could be extended beyond the statutorily
required period.
In Utah the 3 0-day period for filing a notice of appeal
in a criminal case is begins with the entry of the judgment
appealed from.

Utah R. App. P. 4(a). This requirement is

jurisdictional and cannot be enlarged by an appellate court.
Johnson, 635 P.2d at 37. Also, the appellate rules do not allow
the Court to enlarge the period within which an appeal may be
taken.

See Utah R. App. P. 2 (preventing the appellate court

from suspending the 3 0-day filing requirement of rule 4(a)).
Further, only the trial court may extend the time for filing the
notice of appeal, and then only for thirty days.

Utah R. App. P.

4(e).
As argued at Point I of this brief, defendant'a appeal
is out-of-time and must be dismissed.
POINT III
DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Defendant claims that he was denied his constitutional
right to assistance of counsel because his trial proceeded
without him and without defense counsel and that there is no
evidence that he waived his right.

However, as noted Ross, a

defendant who is voluntarily absent "cannot by his voluntary act
invalidate the proceedings."

State v. Ross, 655 P.2d at 642

(quoting State v. Aikers, 51 P.2d 1052, 1055 (Utah 1935)).
"invited error doctrine" functions to prevent a party from
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This

"setting up an error at trial and then complaining of it on
appeal."

Perdue, 813 P.2d at 1205.

See also Mvers, 29 Utah 2d

at 303, 508 P.2d at 1179 (finding that the defendant could not
complain that he was not represented by counsel at part of the
trial when he "flouted the authority of the court by his
absence," and finding that the defendant's claim opened the door
to "invited error").
Like Myers, defendant cannot "flout the authority of
the court" by voluntarily failing to appear for trial and
sentencing, knowing that counsel had withdrawn and knowing that
he was therefore expected to appear, and then claim he was denied
assistance of counsel.

According to Utah case law, a defendant

is voluntarily absent from trial if he "knew or should have known
of the pending trial."

State v. Wacrstaff, 772 P.2d 987, 990

(Utah App. 1989) . The record shows that defendant, who was out
of custody on bail, was adequately notified of his trial and
sentencing dates.

Thus, defendant was voluntarily absent from

his trial.
In arguing that he was denied assistance of counsel,
defendant relies solely on Wacrstaff v. Barnes, 802 P.2d 774 (Utah
App. 1990) ("Waastaff").

In Wacrstaff, the issue was whether the

defendant had waived his right to counsel.
"The right to assistance of counsel . . . may be waived
by a competent accused if the waiver is 'knowingly and
intelligently' made."

State v. Frampton. 737 P.2d 183, 187 (Utah

1987) (citations omitted).

"Courts indulge every reasonable
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presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights."
Waastaff, 802 P.2d at 778 (citations omitted). "The record must
show . . . that the accused was offered counsel but intelligently
and understandingly rejected the offer."

State v. Hamilton, 732

P.2d 505, 507 (Utah 1986) (citations omitted).5

"When reviewing

the record, this court must consider 'the total circumstances of
the individual case including background, experience and the
conduct of the accused/"

State v. Bakalov, 849 P.2d 629, 639

(Utah App. 1993) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (quoting State v.
Drobel, 815 P.2d 724, 733 (Utah App. 1991)) (emphasis added).
In Waastaff, the defendant's counsel, Olson, filed a
motion to withdraw, which was granted.

The record was unclear

whether the defendant received notice of the withdrawal.

At a

5

In Waastaff, this Court noted that trial courts
traditionally ascertained whether an accused had knowingly and
intelligently waived his right to counsel through colloquy
between the court and the accused. Waastaff, 802 P.2d at 778.
The Court cited Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-24, 68
S. Ct. 316, 323 (1948), for the probing investigation required of
the trial court in determining the validity of a purported waiver
of trial counsel. Id.
In Von Moltke, the defendant was charged with espionage
and subject to the death penalty. She was held incommunicado for
almost one month before a lawyer, casually plucked from among
lawyers who happened to be in the courtroom on other business,
was appointed to represent her for two or three minutes at the
arraignment. The district court never appointed another lawyer
to represent the defendant in the plea proceedings, as promised.
Id. 332 U.S. at 716-17, 68 S. Ct. at 320. When the defendant
perfunctorily pleaded guilty by signing a waiver of counsel form,
the trial court did not ask whether she understood the
implications of the indictment, the consequences of her plea or
the possible imposition of the death penalty. Id.
Obviously, the trial court in this case could not
engage in the colloquy required by the Supreme Court in Von
Moltke because defendant refused to appear in court.
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hearing held for the limited purpose of determining whether the
defendant knew of the trial date, Olson could not recall whether
he informed the defendant of the trial date.

Olson also could

not recall instructing the defendant to remain in contact or
warning him that his failure to remain in contact could be
construed as a waiver of his right to assistance of counsel.
Waastaff, 802 P.2d at 777. Neither the defendant nor counsel
appeared at trial, and the defendant was convicted in absentia.
On these facts the Utah Court of Appeals found that

!l

[t]he record

is unclear whether Wagstaff received notice of [counsel's]
withdrawal."

Id. at 777. The court concluded that Wagstaff's

"voluntary absence from trial, in and of itself, was not a waiver
of his right to counsel and that there is no further evidence in
the record"

that "might reasonably be construed as waiver."

Id.

at 779.
Wagstaff is factually distinguishable from this case.
The record shows that long before trial notice was sent to
defendant informing him of at: least Florence's request to
withdraw from representation (R. 52). Defendant correctly notes
that Huntsman's notice was not sent to defendant.
Br. at 8 n.3.

Appellant's

However, eight days after Florence filed his

motion to withdraw, the prosecutor sent defendant a notice to
substitute counsel in both cases within twenty days, since both
his attorneys had withdrawn (R. 48-49).

Florence's motion to

withdraw, as well as Huntsman's, stated that defendant understood
he must appear at trial, alone or with new counsel. Thereafter,
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the prosecutor sent at least four notices and orders informing
defendant of the scheduling conference and the trial.
The only reasonable inference from this record is that
defendant ignored these notices and chose not to retain counsel,
not to attend trial, and not to stay in contact with the trial
court.

Now, after having failed to retain counsel and to appear

at trial and sentencing, defendant cannot claim that his conduct
does not constitute a waiver of counsel or that the error which
he set up is a basis for appeal.

To find for defendant would be

to allow a "mischievously inclined defendant to profit by his own
wrongdoing."

State v. Myers, 29 Utah 2d 254, 256, 508 P.2d 41,

42 (Utah 1973).
Thus, this Court should decline to consider the merits
of defendant's claim because to do so would sanction a procedure
that invites error.

However, if it does reach the merits, it

should find that defendant voluntarily waived his constitutional
right to counsel.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's convictions
should be affirmed.

^
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

Utah Constitution
Article I, Section 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused
shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel, to demand the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses
against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the county or district in
which the offense is alleged to have been
committed, and the right to appeal in all
cases. In no instance shall any accused
person, before final judgment, be compelled
to advance money or fees to secure the rights
herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be
compelled to give evidence against himself; a
wife shall not be compelled to testify
against her husband, nor a husband against
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put
in jeopardy for the same offense.
Utah Rules o£ Criminal Procedure
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment.
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant
may be tried in his absence, he may likewise
be sentenced in his absence. If a defendant
fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for
his arrest may be issued by the court.

(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or
plea of no contest, the court shall impose
sentence and shall enter a judgment of
conviction which shall include the plea or
the verdict, if any, and the sentence.
Following imposition of sentence, the court
shall advise the defendant of his right to
appeal and the time within which any appeal
shall be filed.

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Rule 2. Suspension of rules.
In the interest of expediting a decision,
the appellate court, on its own motion or for
extraordinary cause shown, may, except as to
the provisions of Rules 4(a), 4(b), 4(e),
5(a), and 48, suspend the requirements or
provisions of any of these rules in a
particular case and may order proceedings in
that case in accordance with its direction.
Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken.
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order.
In a case in which an appeal is permitted as
a matter of right from the trial court to the
appellate court, the notice of appeal
required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the
clerk of the trial court within 30 days after
the date of entry of the judgment or order
appealed from. However, when a judgment or
order is entered in a statutory forcible
entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice
of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed
with the clerk of the trial court within 10
days after the date of entry of the judgment
or'order appealed from.

(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial
court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or
good cause, may extend the time for filing a
notice of appeal upon motion filed not later
than 30 days after the expiration of the time
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule. A
motion filed before expiration of the
prescribed time may be ex parte unless the
trial court otherwise requires. Notice of a
motion filed after expiration of the
prescribed time shall be given to the other
parties in accordance with the rules of
practice of the trial court. No extension
shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time
or 10 days from the date of entry of the
order granting the motion, whichever occurs
later.

UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

B u I e S ! Sentence and Judgment
(a) Sentence.

It) Notification of Right to Appeal After imposing sentence in a case which
has gone to trial on a plea of not guilty, the court shall advisl the defendant of the
defendant's right to appeal, including any right to appeal the sentence, and of the
right of a person who in unable to pay the cost of an appeal to apply for leave to
appeal in fonna pauperis. There shall be no duty on the eourt to advise the
defendant of any right of appeal after sentence is imposed following a plea of guilty
or nolo contendere, except that the court shall advise the defendant of any right to
appeal the sentence, If the defendant so requests, the derk of the court shall
prepare and fQe forthwith a notice of appeal on behalf of the defendant

ADDENDUM B

Brian R. Florence
#1091
of FLORENCE AND HUTCHISON
Attorney at Law
818-26th Street
Ogden, UT
84401
399-9291 - / FAX 399-9333

fvR^rr^tnu

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

vs.

•
•
:

MOTION TO WITHDRAW
AS COUNSEL

f

DONALD E. LEWIS,
Defendant.

:
•
•

Case No. 91-CR-0071
Case No. 921600003
Hon. David L. Mower

Comes now Brian R. Florence, Attorney at Law, and
hereby moves the Court for permission to withdraw as counsel
for the above-named defendant's cases. This Motion is made
upon the grounds and for the reasons that the defendant has
indicated that he is unwilling to pay the necessary attorney
fee to try his cases.
A Motion to Suppress is pending before the Court as is
a Motion to Consolidate.

One of the cases designated above

is scheduled for trial on December 21-23, 1992. The trial on
FLORENCE
and
IUTCHISON

OFESSIONAL
3RPORATION
TORNEYS AT
LAW
• 26TH STREET
EN, UTAH 84401

the other case has not yet been set, nor has the Court rules

STATE v. LEWIS
Case No. 91-CR-0071
Case No. 921600003
Motion to Withdraw
Page No. 2

on the Motions referred to above. If the Motion to Suppress
is granted, this Motion to Withdraw would be considered moot.
If the Motion to Suppress is denied and the Motion to
Consolidated

granted,

presumably

the

matter

would

be

continued to a later date to permit sufficient time to try
the facts in both cases, in which event no party would be
prejudiced by granting the undersigned's request to withdraw.
The defendant is aware that the undersigned intends to
make this request and that he would be responsible for
appearing with counsel or by himself at any future trial
setting.

.

rffL

DATED this /.)

— day of October, 1992.
NCE AND HUTCHISON

BRIAN R. FLORENCE
Attorney at Law
818-26th Street
Ogden, UT
84401
FLORENCE
and
UTCHISON

3FESSIONAL
RPORATION
rORNEYS AT
LAW
26TH STREET
IN, UTAH 84401
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II
STATE v. LEWIS
Case No. 91-CR-0071
Case No. 921600003
Motion to Withdraw
Page No. 3

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, postage
prepaid, to the following at the addresses listed on this

j&

day of October, 1992,
Donald E. Lewis
Defendant
71 Fairhope Circle
Arab, AL
35016
James R. Scarth
Deputy Kane County Attorney
76 North Main
Kanab, UT
84741
R'. Clayton Huntsman
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1425
St. George, UT
84771

^ILEEti^HRISTEN&fi*^?, Secretary

FLORENCE
and
HUTCHISON

PROFESSIONAL
CORPORATION
ATTORNEYS AT
LAW
8 • 26TH STREET
FDEN, UTAH 84401

&

ORIGINAL
«ANE COUNTV

NM t 2

R. CLAYTON HUNTSMAN-1600
Attorney for Defendant
2 West St. George Boulevard
Ancestor Square Tower Building - Suite 31
P.O. Box 1425
St. George, Utah 84770
Tel: (801) 628-2846

^^HOlSTft/CT^oT^"-*

IN AND FOR THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT
KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
MOTION
FOR
ORDER
AUTHORIZING WITHDRAWAL
OF COUNSEL

Plaintiff,
vs.
DONALD E. LEWIS,
Defendant.

Case No.

91-Cr-0071

Comes now R. Clayton Huntsman, co-counsel of record for
Defendant Donald E. Lewis, and respectfully moves the Court for
permission to withdraw as counsel for said defendant.
This motion is made for the following reasons:
1.

Defendant has indicated that he is unwilling to pay the

necessary attorney fee to try this case and its potentially joined
case, No. 921600003.

Said counsel is not of record in
1

<&>

No.

9216000031.
2.

Defendant has otherwise not cooperated with counsel,

making counselvs attempt to adequately defend much more difficult
and essentially impractical.
3. Other good and compelling case which counsel is unable to
disclose to this Court justifies this motion.
4. It appears that the trial date of December 21-23, 1992, is
impractical to try both cases, in which case no party would be
prejudiced by granting undersigned1s request to withdraw.
5.

Defendant has been advised often over the past year of

this request and understands that he is responsible for appearing
at any future trial setting, with or without new counsel.
6.

Other good cause appears in support of this Motion.

7.

This motion is made pursuant to Rule permitting ruling

without hearing.
DATED this

£/

day of

Attorney/for Defendant
I do not oppose this motion:

~"^-Ji^ Scarth
Kane County Attorney

<6i

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I do hereby certify that on the PJ
day of C^ycf^U-*
f
1992, I nailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR
ORDER AUTHORIZING WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL, postage pre-paid by
depositing same in the United States Mail, to the following, to
wit:
Jin Scarth
Kane County Attorney
76 North Main
Kanab, Utah 84741
Brian R. Florence
FLORENCE AND HUTCHISON
Attorney at Law
818-26th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
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Jim R. Scarth #2870
Kane County Attorney
Kane County Courthouse
76 North Main
Kanab, Utah 84741
Telephone: (801) 644-5278

H^n^U

SIXTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
KANE COUNTY
76 North Main
Kanab, Utah 84741
Telephone (801) 644-2458, Facsimile (801) 644-2096
STATE OF UTAH,
|

NOTICE TO SUBSTITUTE
COUNSEL

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 921600003
91-CR-0071

DONALD E. LEWIS,
Defendant.

TO: DONALD E. LEWIS
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Defendant's attorneys having
withdrawn, you are hereby given notice to substitute counsel in
the above captioned cases within TWENTY (20) days.
DATED this XS^

day of October, 1992.

A_A

State vs. Lewis
Notice to Substitute Counsel
Case No. 921600003, 91-CR-0071
Page 2
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on thisCy^r*1 day of October, 1992,
mailed a true, full and correct copy of the above foregoing
Notice with first class postage, to:

Donald E. Lewis, 71

Fairhope Circle, Arab, Alabama 35016

f/\^j£ix

V
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ADDENDUM D

n.

c—*

Jim R. Scarth #2870
Kane County Attorney
Kane County Courthouse
76 North Main
Kanab, Utah 84741
Telephone 801-644-5278
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
KANE COUNTY
76 North Main
Kanab, Utah 84741
Telephone: (801) 644-5278, Facsimile (801) 644-2096
THE STATE OF UTAH,

]|

ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.

;

DONALD E. LEWIS,

J

Defendant.

CASE NO. 921600003
91-CR-0071

>

The above captioned matter came on regularly for a hearing
on Friday the 20th day of November, 1992 at Kanab, Utah.

The

Plaintiff was present and was represented by the Kane County
Attorney.

The Defendant was not present however, his counsel of

record R. Clayton Huntsman was present.

A Motion to Withdraw as

counsel was filed by Brian Florence and R. Clayton Huntsman.
Motion to Consolidate cases has been filed by the Kane
County Attorney.

&

A

State vs. Lewis
Order
Case No. 921600003
Page 2
The Court having heard arguments reveiwed the files and
records herein and good cause appearing therefore, it is hereby
Ordered as follows:
The motions to withdraw as counsel for Defendant are hereby
granted.
The motion to consolidate is hereby granted and this case
is hereby consolidated for trial with Kane County District Court
case number 91-CR-0071
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the above named Defendant is to
appear in person at the above entitled Court on Friday the 4th
day of December, 1992, at 9:00 a.m. before the Honorable Don V.
Tibbs for a scheduling conference.

In the event the Defendant

fails to appear in person on or before said date and request a
jury trial, this matter will be set for non jury trial to
commence at 9:00 a.m. on December 21, 1992.
DATED this

/H

day of December, 1992.

3^

State vs. Lewis
Order
CAse No. 921600003
Page 3
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this

If

day of December, 1992,

I mailed a true, full and correct copy of the above foregoing
Order, with first class postage, to:

R. Clayton Huntsman, P.O.

Box 1425, St. George, Utah, Brain Florence, 818 26th Street,
Ogden, Utah 84401, Donald Lewis, 71 Fair Hope Circle, Arab, AL.
35016.

WlQi/iicg Ghapt f>
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ADDENDUM E

Jim R. Scarth #2870
Kane County Attorney
Kane County Courthouse
76 North Main
Kanab, Utah 84741
Telephone: (801) 644-5278
SIXTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
KANE COUNTY
76 North Main
Kanab, Utah 84741
Telephone (801) 644-2458, Facsimile (801) 644-2096
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

]
NOTICE OF SCHEDULING
CONFERENCE

;)

vs.
DONALD E. LEWIS

]
CASE NO. 921600003

Defendant.

TO:

]

DONALD E. LEWIS
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the above-entitled case has been

set for scheduling before the Honorable DON V. TIBBS Judge of the
District Court, County of Kane, State of Utah, in the District
Courtroom of the Kane County Courthouse, at Kanab, Utah, on
Friday the 4th day of December 1992, at 9:00 o'clock a.m.
You must appear in person before the above entitled Court
at said place, date and

time.

Please be advised that the Court has scheduled a non-jury
trial in this case and if you desire a jury trial you must
request the same on or before December 4, 1992.

44

State v s . Lewis
Notice
Case No. 921600003
Page 2

PLEASE
GOVERN
ACCORDING.
jrUXaKOL*
V3UVLIUM YOURSELF
XUU.KO.Dljr
Hl~V~U.K.iJJLIMl?.

DATED this jZ5

day of November,

F2.

"^\J*M R. SCARTH
Kane County Attorney
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this C / S

day of If J Oi^flyJhiL ,

1992, I mailed a true, full and correct copy of the above and
foregoing NOTICE OF SCHEDULING, with first-class postage thereon
fully prepaid to:
Alabama, 35016
Utah 84770

Donald Lewis, 71 Fair Hope Circle, Arab,

R. Clayton Huntsman, P.O. Box 1425, St.

Goerge,

Brain Florence, 818 26th Street, Ogden, Utah 84401,

A

^

If A , MflitJ

ADDENDUM F

Jim R. Scarth #2870
Kane County Attorney
Kane County Courthouse
76 North Main
Kanab, Utah 84741
Telephone: (801) 644-5278
SIXTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
KANE COUNTY
76 North Main
Kanab, Utah 84741
Telephone (801) 644-2458, Facsimile (801) 644-2096
THE STATE OF UTAH,

]
NOTICE NON-JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff,

]

vs.
DONALD E. LEWIS

]
CASE NO. 921600003

Defendant.

TO;

DONALD E. LEWIS
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the above-entitled case has been

set for non-jury trial before the Honorable DON V. TIBBS Judge of
the District Court, County of Kane# State of Utah, in the
District Courtroom of the Kane County Courthouse, at Kanab, Utah,
on Monday the 21st day of December 1992, at 9:00 o'clock a.m.
You must appear in person before the above entitled Court
at said place, date and time.

4-1

State vs. Lewis
Notice
Case No. 921600003
Page 2
PLEASE GOVERN YOURSELF ACCORDING.
DATED this Jr

day of December, 1^32;

"^^V^alM R~ SCARTH
Kane County Attorney
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this ffi^ day of \^/SCJllOdDfAj
1992, I mailed a true, full and correct copy of the above and
foregoing NOTICE OF NON-JURY TRIAL, with first-class postage
thereon fully prepaid to:

Donald Lewis, 71 Fair Hope Circle,

Arab, Alabama, 35016.

Vfl0Mf(\ ^ifipeD

fr

ADDENDUM G

PAGE 4
9:30 A.M.
21ST DECEMBER 1992
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

1
2
3

THE COURT:

Thank you.

4

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

Today is

5

December 21st, 1992.

It's about 9:30 in the morning by the

6

clock on the wall. Mr. Scarth is here and I have two files

7

that name Donald Leu/is.
No one is sitting at defense table, and I assume

8
9

Mr. Lewis is not here.

10

Scarth?

Would you know him by sight, Mr.

11

MR. SCARTH:

12

Your Honor, there's so many witness here he has.

13

He doesn't appear to have been here as of yet, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

14
15
16
17
18
19

I've never seen him.

Okay.

What's your desire, Mr.

Scarth?
STATE'S MOTION TO TRY CASE IN ABSENCE OF DEFENDANT
MR. SCARTH:

The State would move the Court to be

allowed to try this case in absence of the defendant.
THE COURT:

When we look at the file; I think

20

there have been notices sent to him and his lawyers and I

21

think you've sent most of those, haven't you?

22

MR. SCARTH:

Yeah.

I don't mean to be facetious,

23

but for months we've been sending notices of the trial on

24

this dayt orginally that it would be a jury trial on this

25

date at the "a.m."; and then, more recently* that it would

1

be—[INAUB.IDLE].
THE COURT:

2
3

Post Office?

4

MR. SCARTH:

S

THE COURT:

6

None of those ever came back from the

None have ever been returned.
But you've never had any affirmative

reaction from Mr. Leu/is that he ever got anything from you.
MR. SCARTH:

7

That's right.

I've sent him not

8

only notices of the trial, but notice of the substitute

9

counsel, various orders prior to being signed, for his

10

review, after being signed by the Court.

11

copies.

12

I've never heard from Mr. Lewis, ever.

13

on my staff.

15

We've received no reaction from him since—well,

THE COURT:

14

We've sent him

Neither has anyone

He had two lawyers at one time and

they both sent him a notice to appoint counsel.

16

MR. SCARTH:

Correct.

17

Through his attorneys, of course, I've heard from

18

him.

19

both withdrawn.

20

the Court read the numbers into the record?

21

remember.

22

But only through his former attorneys.

They've now

These cases have been consolidated.

THE COURT:

No, I didn't.

I don't

And I should do that.

23

The older number—the older case is 91CR0071, and the

24

newer case is 921600003.

25

MR. SCARTH:

Did

On that 03 case I'm not sure he

PAGE 6
1

was ever arraigned; and since the State1s moving to be

2

allowed to proceed in his absence, I frankly don't know how

3

to handle that, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

4

Well, I don't know whether he has

5

either, except there was an entry of a not guilty plea in

6

writing by one of—by his former lawyer.
MR. SCARTH:

7

The attorneys have appeared for him

8

and have entered a not guilty plea, so I guess he has been

9

arraigned.

10

THE COURT:

11

Well, I'm satisfied that Mr. Lewis knows about

12

these proceedings today and has voluntarily chosen not to

13

appear and the motion, by the State, to proceed in the

14

absense of Mr. Lewis is granted;
And you have witnesses here and you're prepared

15
16

to proceed.

17

MR. SCARTH:

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. SCARTH:

20
21

I think he has been.

That's correct.
How many witnesses, do you think?
I haven't counted.

I think there1s

seven.
THE COURT:

Okay.

I looked at therfiles this

22

morning and was looking for informations and Ifm wondering

23

about how many different charges.

24

MR. SCARTH:

25

There are eight counts, Your Honor,

and they should be all contained in the amended information,

ADDENDUM H
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Jim R. Scarth #2870
Kane County Attorney
Kane County Courthouse
76 North Main
Kanab, Utah 84741
Telephone 801-644-5278

DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
KANE COUNTY
76 North Main
Kanab, Utah 84741
Telephone: (801) 644-5278, Facsimile (801) 644-2096
THE STATE OF UTAH,

5UBGMENT-

Plaintiff,
vs.
DONALD E. LEWIS,
CASE NO. 91-CR-0071

Defendant.

The above-captioned matter came on regularly for non-jury
trial before the above entitled Court on Monday the 21st day of
December, 1992, at Kanab, Utah.

The Plaintiff was present and

was represented by the Kane County Attorney.

The Defendant

failed to appear either in person or by an attorney.

The State

moved the Court to proceed to trial in Defendants absence.
motion was granted.

Said

The State called witnesses to testify and

exhibits were entered and received into evidence.

iB

State vs. Lewis
Judgment
Case No. 91-CR-0071
Page 2
The Court, having heard the testimony of the witnesses and
having considered the evidence found from the same that the
Defendant is guilty, as charged, beyond a reasonable doubt of the
offenses of Count I, II, UNLAWFUL TAKING OF PROTECTED WILDLIFE, a
class A misdemeanor, Count III, IV, WASTE OF PROTECTED WILDLIFE,
a class B misdemeanor, Count V, VI, AIDING AND ASSISTING IN
UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF PROTECTED WILDLIFE, a class A misdemeanor,
and Count VII, VIII, AIDING AND ASSISTING IN THE WASTE OF
PROTECTED WILDLIFE, a class B misdemeanor.
Sentencing in this matter will commence on January 22, 1993
at 9:00 a.m. at Kanab, Utah.

The Defendant's presence at

sentencing is required.
DATED this

day of January, 1993.
BY THE COURT:

DAHXB'L. MOWER
District Court Judge
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this
/ *?*fr- day of January,
1993, I mailed a true, full and correct copy of the above
foregoing Judgment with first-class postage, to: Donald E.
Lewis, 71 Fair Hope Circle, Arab, AL. 35016

Mon/M Dm/in

ADDENDUM I

A

Jim R. Scarth #2870
Kane County Attorney
Kane County Courthouse
76 North Main
Kanab, Utah 84741
Telephone: (801) 644-5278

.tf&ITUi^M\

SIXTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
KANE COUNTY
76 North Main
Kanab, Utah 84741
Telephone (801) 644-2458, Facsimile (801) 644-2096
THE STATE OF UTAH,
NOTICE OF SENTENCING
Plaintiff,
vs.
DONALD E. LEWIS
CASE NO. 91-CR-0071
Defendant.

TO:

DONALD LEWIS
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the above-entitled case has been

set for sentencing before the Honorable DAVID L. MOWER Judge of
the District Court, County of Kane, State of Utah, in the
District Courtroom of the Kane County Courthouse, at Kanab, Utah,
on Friday the 22nd day of January 1993, at 9:00 o'clock a.m.
Your presence is required.
PLEASE GOVERN .VOURSELF ACCORDING.
DATED this _ j £ _ aay of January 1993,
JJft R.
NJST

SCARTH
Kane County Attorney

^

State vs. Lewis
Notice
Case No. 91-CR-0071
Page 2

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that on this \P^

day ofsJfliJAA>fll !u L

1992, I mailed a true, full and correct copy of the above and
foregoing NOTICE OF SENTENCING, with first-class postage thereon
fully prepaid to:

Donald Lewis, 71 Fair Hope Circle, Arab, AL.

35016.

M.flmf.AQXnfUTn
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ADDENDUM J

PAGE 3
9:00 A.M.
22ND JANUARY 1993

1

SENTENCING

2

THE COURT:

3
4

State vs. Donald E. Lewis. Today's

the date for sentencing.
I see an officer from Wildlife Resources coming

5
6

to sit with Mr. Scarth.

7

responding.

I don't see anybody else

8

Donald E. Lewis, with you are you here?

9

[NO RESPONSE]

10

Mr. Lewis was previously convicted at a trial

11

that was held in his absencer but he received notice, in my

12

opinion.

13

Class-B Misdemeanors.

14

hearing nowr Mr. Scarth?

15

He was convicted of two Class-A Misdemeanors—six

MR. SCARTH:

Any reason not to have the sentencing

Noner Your Honor.

16

defendant has received adequate notice.

17

him notice some time back.

18

I believe the

My office mailed

The judgment itself, which was dated by this

19

Court on the 14th of January, 1993f the last sentence says

20

"Sentencing in this matter will commence on January 22nd,

21

1993f at 9:00 a.m. in Kanabf Utah.

22

at sentencing is required.M

23

The defendant's presence

Now that wasn't mailed to Mr. Lewis until the

24

19th day of January, 1993; however, prior to mailing it to

25

the Court some four or five days prior to the 19th—what I'm

PAGE 4
1

saying is five days prior to that, we mailed Mr. Lewis a

2

letter with a proposed order, telling him if he had any

3

objections, let me know in five days.

4

him.

I never heard from

5

It was also in about that same time frame that we

6

sent him a notice to appear here—specifically to appear for

7

sentencing at this time, place, and date.

8

THE COURT:

9

sent other papers to.

10
11
12

MR. SCARTH:

It's the same address that you've

That's correct.

And nothing's come

back undelivered.
THE COURT:

Today's the day for sentencing.

13

don't see a reason not to hold a sentencing hearing.

14

What penalty should I impose, Mr. Scarth?
PLAINTIFF'S RECOMMENDATION

15
16
17

MR. SCARTH:

THE COURT:

19

MR. SCARTH:

21
22
23
24
25

Your Honor, you have eight charges

before you for which he's been convicted.

18

20

I

Two Class-A's—
No.

You have four Class-A's and

four Class-B's.
THE COURT:

In the order that I signed on January

14th, it refers to two Class-A's, Counts 1 and 2.
MR. SCARTH:

Yeah.

And then read on further and

you'll see two more Class-A, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

And then it says Counts 3 and 4,

ADDENDUM K

Jim R. Scarth #2870
Kane County Attorney
Kane County Courthouse
76 North Main
Kanab, Utah 84741
Telephone 801-644-5278
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
KANE COUNTY
76 North Main
Kanab, Utah 84741
Telephone: (801) 644-5278, Facsimile (801) 644-2096
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

]|

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE AND
AND ORDER OF FORFEITURE

]

vs.

;

DONALD E. LEWIS,

]

Defendant.

'

CASE NO. 91-CR-0071

The above-captioned matter came on regularly for sentencing
before the above-entitled Court on Friday the 22nd day of
January, 1993# at Kanab, Utah.

The Plaintiff was present and was

represented by the Kane County Attorney.

The Defendant did not

appear either in person or by counsel.
SENTENCING
IT IS THE SENTENCE OF THIS COURT that for each of the four
(4) class A misdemeanor the Defendant be confined and imprisoned
in the Kane County Jail for a period of one (1) year for a total
of four (4) years, and for each of the four (4) class B
misdemeanors the Defendant be confined and imprisoned in the Kane
County Jail for a period of six (6) months for a total of twenty
four (24) months, all suspended except for two (2) years.

State vs. Lewis
Judgment
Case No . 91-CR-0071
Page 2
The Defendant is fined as follows:

for each class A

misdemeanor the amount of TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS
($2,500.00), plus an 85% surcharge, and for each class B
misdemeanor the amount of ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($1,000.00), plus
an 85% surcharge for a total of TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED
DOLLARS ($25,900.00).
It is further ordered that the Defendant pay restitution to
the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources Help Stop Poaching Fund
in the amount of ONE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED DOLLARS ($1,600.00).
•••
*«»

FORFEITURE

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following items be forfeited
to the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources.
1.

Remington 7mm mag model 700 with Redfield scope serial #

A6764329 with beige gun case.
2.

Weatherby 270 mag with Redfield scope and bipod Serial #

129743 with black guncase with bore sight sling.
3.

Remington 30.06 model 700 Serial # C6345364 with Bushnell

scope with hard guncase.
4•

Hatchet

5.

Blacksaw

i

State vs. Lewis
Judgment
CAse No. 921600018
Page 3

6.

Bucksight knife

7.

Silver pocket knife

8.

Photo album containing pictures of unlawfully taken wildlife

9.

6 VHS video tapes showing illegally taken wildlife

10. Black vinyl brief case (and contents) containing notes of
illegal activity and future illegal activity
11. Thompson Center Arms .357 (Herret) handgun Serial # 228086
with Tasco scope with detachable rifle stock.
12. 1 pair blue trax sneakers
13. 1 pair Browning Nomad boots
14. 1988 Chevrolet pick up Alaska Plate 9217 CN Vin #
IGCFK24HOJZ14334
WARRANT
The Court hereby authorizes the issuance of a no bond
warrant.
JURISDICTION
The Court retains jurisdiction over all sentencing
matters.

State vs. Lewis
Judgment
Case No. 91-CR-0071
Page 4
BAIL
Bail in this matter will be forfeited to pay the
restitution as well as the fines in this case.
DATED this

1 1

day of ff'&

, 1993.

BY THE COURT:
^1 ,•'

/ /11

DAVID L. MOWER
District Court Judge
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this o r ?

day

ot^^/ft/MAdf

1993, I mailed a true, full and correct copy of the above
foregoing Judgment, with first-class postage, to:

Donald Lewis,

71 Fair Hope Circle, Arab, AL. 35016.

Zfl.tkiLfklJ
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